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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GRANT M. ROBERTSON and EDITH
WILLIAMS ROBERTSON, aka EDITH L.
ROBERTSON, his wife,
Pl.aintifts and Respondents,

vs.
DONALD W. GEIS; SLOAN SMITH;
SLOAN SMITH ASSOCIATES, LTD.; FIRST
DIVIDEND CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; and INTERMOUNTAIN CAPITAL
CORPORATION OF UTAH,
Defendants and Appellants,

Case No.

12902

and

/3c71

INTERMOUNTAIN CAPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH,
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff and
Appellant,

vs.
JOHN W. ROBERTSON and ZELDA ROBERTSON, his wife,
Third-Party Defendants and Respondents.
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SLOAN SMITH AND DONALD W. GEIS

F

·1

0

13/3

D

'l'ABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

NATURE OF THE CASK

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ________________________________ 2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL__ __________________ ------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ______________ ---------------------------------------------

3

ARGUMENT

5

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT SMITH
AND GEIS HAD COMMITTED FRAUD AS THE
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS NOT ONLY FAILED
TO ESTABLISH FRAUD BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF, BUT THE EVIDENCE, AS A MATTER
OF LAW, WAS TO THE CONTRARY.---------------------------CONCLUSION

5

------------------------------------------------------------------·--- 12

CASES CITED
Stuck vs. Delta Land and Water Company,
63 Utah 445, 227 Pac. 97L______________________________________________

7

Seyhold v;;. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
121 Utah 61, 239 P .2d 17 4 -------------------------------------------------- 12
Continental Bank and Trust Company vs. Stewart,
4 Ut. 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 _____________________________________________________ 12,

TABLE OF CONTENTS-( Continued)
Page
Papanikolas vs. Sampson, et al.,
73 Utah 404, 27 4 Pac. 856. _________________ -------------------------------- .. 5, 6
Hull vs. Flinders,
83 Utah 158, 27 P.2d 56 ________________________________________________________ 5, 6
Neilson vs. Leamington Mines,
S7 Utah 69, 48 P.2d 439·------------------·--------·-------·--·---·----·-------5,7
Adamson, et ux., vs. Brockbank, et al.,
112 Utah 52 (1947), 185 P.2d 264. ______________________________________ JO,
Oberg vs. Sanders, et al.,
184 P.2d 229 (1947) ------------------------ ---------------------------------·----Jl,

TEXTS CITED
9 Wigmore Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2494----------··-···-----------·12
37 Am. Jur. 2d p. 92, Section 60, also Section 68, p. 104__________ 5

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GRANT 1\1. ROBERTSON and EDITH
WILLIAMS ROBERTSON, aka EDITH L.
ROBERTSON, his wife,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
DONALD W. GEIS; SLOAN SMITH;
SLOAN SMITH ASSOCIATES, LTD.; FIRST
DIVIDEND CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; and INTERMOUNTAIN CAPITAL
CORPORATION OF UTAH,
Defendants and Appellants,
and

Case No.

12902

INTERMOUNTAIN CAPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH,
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff and
Appellant,

vs.
JOHN W. ROBERTSON and ZELDA ROBERTSON, his wife,
Third-Party Defendants and Respondents.

BRIJjJF
DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS
SLOAN SMITH AND DONALD W. GEIS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action by the Plaintiffs against the
Geis and Sloan Smith for damages
Def Pndants Donald
for fraud and as against the Defendant InteTMountain

')
....

Capital Company to void and set aside a 111qrtgagP whid 1
said company held against certain n·al
ow1wd
hy the Plaintiffs and Third-Party D\'frndants.

DISPOSITION lN LO\VEH COURT
rrhe Honorablt> Bryant l J. Croft, District Judge of

Salt Lake County, Utah, granted a judgment against the
Defendant-Appt>llants Smith and Geis.

ON APPEAL

RELIEF'

a n'Yl::'l'Sal of the
judgment and a judgment of no causr of aetion against
the Plaintiff.
The Defrnclant-Appdlants

OF' FACTS
l\1r. Sloan Smith formed Sloan Smith and Associates,
Ltd., a Bermuda eorporation, in F'ebrnary, 19G:2 (R-382).
Mr. Smith, as president and the prineipal stockholder,
organized the company for tlw purpose of purchasing
equipmPnt for resnlP in South and Central Amerita
(R-384) Early in 1%3, l\lr. Smith negotiated with Mr.

•John

of lntt>r.Mountain Capital Cor-

poration, to obtain additional \rnrking eapital for
business (TI-487). ln orclf•r to t·omplde tlw tram;action
with Interl\foimtain Capital, l\lr. Smith and Mr. Geis,

3
an

of Sloan Smith Associates, Ltd., turned

cffcr to the

< orporation

their personal money and prop-

nty (R--±:35-463-470) and sought to obtain additional
property to ht> iiledged along with their own to secure
a loan from Inter]'\fountain Capital Corporation in the
umount of $1i0,000.00. One of the people with whom Mr.
Geis disc·ussed the possibility of investment was the
Plaintiff-R<>s1iondent, Mr. Robertson. These discussions
wNe <:arried on over a period of several weeks. In May,
Mr. Robertson and his wife delivered a deed to
acres of farm property in Salt Lake County (P-1),
to Mr. Geis, as agent of Sloan Smith Assoiciates, Ltd.
The delivery was a conditional delivery and subject to the
terms of a Memorandum Agreement prepared by Mr.
Smith (P-2). Prior to the actual delivery of the property,
l\l r. Geis, on lwhalf of the corporation, delivered the afore..

mentioned l\lemorandmn Agreement to the Robertsons
for their review (R-332-333). The Robertsons reviewed
the agreement and contacted Mr. Geis complaining the
agreement did not contain the terms which Geis had
previously represented it wonld contain, and, further,
reqnested that Mr. Smith snbmit a new proposal (R-334).
l\l r. Smith, however, would only accept the property
under the

set forth in that Memorandum Agree-

ment. After refaining the agreement for ten days, to
two wedrn (R-378), the Robertsons signed the same, and
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when it was delivPred to Geis, l\lr. Robertson stated "I
told him if they wouldn't live up to that, they wouldn't
live up to an:'-' contract or something to that effect."
(R-334).
During the course of the trial, a great point was
made by

that they were reluctantly led to the

point of parting with their property. Yet, after the deed
to the property, which is the subject of this lawsuit, was
delivered to Mr. Geis, a much more valuable piece of
property, a motel of net value of $70,000.00, was tendered
by Robertsons to Geis. This was not accepted by Geis
for the reason that by conunitting their own assets to
the project, Smith and Geis had acquired sufficient
property to obtain the money needed from Interl\fountain
Capital. (R-701-703). The South American venture, the
business all of the parties hoped would be successful,
failed, ( R-515-516), and because the results were not as
all parties beliend they would be, Plaintiff-Respondents
now claim fraud by Mr. Geis and Mr. Smith and InterMountain Capital seeks an inten_•st in the property of
the Robertsons greater than the conditions provided for
in the Memorandum Agreement (P-2), even though,
through its President, Mr. \:Vhitley, InterMountain Capital took the property with notice that its use was to be
only for a period of ten years (R-479-480-488).

5
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT SMITH AND
GEIS HAD COMMITTED FRAUD AS THE PLAINTIFFRESPONDEN"TS

NOT

ONLY

FAILED

TO

ESTABLISH

FRAUD BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF, BUT THE
EVIDENCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WAS TO THE CONTRARY.

PROMISES IN GOOD FAITH
The general rule is that fraud cannot be predicated
on statements which are promissory in their nature when
made and which relate to future action or conduct. In
other words, U:Dless fraudulent intentions exist when
the alleged promises and representations are made, they
do not constitute fraud, for which an action of deceit can
be maintained.
37 Am. Jnr. 2d, p. 92, Section 60, also Section 68,
p. 104.

Papanikolas, et al., vs. Sampson, et al., 73 Utah
404, 274 Pac. 856.
Hull vs. Fli nders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P.2d 56.
1

Neilson vs. Leamington Mi1ies & Exploration
Corporation, 87 Utah 69, 48 P.2d 439.

6
In Pa1Hmikolus n;. ,'-J'ampson, supra, the Court said:
As to what constitutes actionablt, fraud, respondents
quote the following from 12 R.C.L. pp. 254, 255:
"Since a fraud must relate to facts than exist
ing or which have previously existed, the general
rule is that fraud cannot be predicated upon statements promissory in their nature and relating to
future actions, nor upon the mere failure to perform a promise, or an agreement to do something
at a future time. or to rnakt' good subsequent conditions which have been assured. Nor, it is held,
is such nonperformance alone ever evidence of
fraud. Reasons given for this rule are that a mere
promise to perform an act in the future is not, in
a legal st'nse, a representation, and a failure
to perform it does not change its character. More-

over, a representation that somcthimg will be done
the future, or a promise to do it, from its
nature cannot be true or false at the time when
madP. The failure to make it good is merely a
breach of contract, which must been enforced by
an action on the contract, if at all.'' (Italics

added.)

Also, in Hull cs. FlindPrs, supra, the Court stated:

"* * * H cnce to render nonperforrr1Jance fra11d-

1tlent, the intention not to perform mitst exist when
the
is made, and if the promise is made
'in good faith when th!? contract is entered i.nto,
there is no fraud though the promisor subsrquently changes his mind and fails or refitses to pero rm." (Italics added.)

t
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In Nielson vs. Leamington Mines arnd Exploration
Corporation, 8upra, the Court declared:
"* * * To predicate a cause of action in fraud
upon a failure to perform a promise, there must
be an intention on the part of the promisor at
the time of making the promise not to perform it."
"If the promise is made in good faith when
the contract is entered into, there is no fraud
though the promisor subsequently changes his
mind and fails or refuses to perform." 12 R.C.L.
262; Hull vs. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P.2d 56.

Non performance of the promise alone is not evidence of
fraud. 12 R.C.L. 255.
\Ve urge that the evidence established that all repre8entation8 made by Smith and Geis at the time of the
transaction with Roberstons were made in good faith,
with full intent to comply with the promises made, and
that in any event, the Respondents, the Robertsons, did
not rely on their representations. While we believe it is
clear from the evidence that Geis and Smith were acting
in good faith, the Robertsons have failed to sustain their
burden of proof and to establish by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. If subsequent irregularities
occurred in the handling of the property, there was no
intent at the time the contract was entered into or prior
thereto that such should occur. Stuck vs. Delta Land
and Water Company, 63 Utah 445, 227 Pac. 971.
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The taking of the Robertsons' property for security
purposes was made when Sloan Smith Associates, Ltd.,
had and was experiencing a successful operation in
Central America, when l\fr. Smith was personally worth a
substantial amount of money and at a time when he had
reason to believe that his operation in Central America
would continue to be successful and would yield substantial profits (R-412). The company had shipped to and
sold buses in South and Central America, from which a
profit of over $100,000.00 had been realized. After the
contract with the Robertsons had been entered into, the
company shipped equipment to Central America between
September, 1963, and January, 1964, valued in excess of
$200,000,00. This was paid for in part by the $60,000.00
loan from InterMountain Capital Corporation as it was
represented to Roberstons it would be.
With this background of a successful operation by
the company, it is illogical to maintain that Smith and
Geis had a plan in mind to defraud the Robertsons and
that they or the company did not intend to keep the
promises made by them.
Also, subsequent and within a few weeks to the
transaction in question, the Robertsons offered to Smith
and Geis, additional property, a motel of the approximate
value (net) of $70,000.00 to be used by therm in the same
way and for the same purposes as the 81/z acres. It is
undisputed that the property was refused as the company
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had completed its financing program as far as bringing
in other investors was concerned (R-703-704).
Lt is not reasonable to believe that Smith and Geis
would have refused this additional property if they had
any intent to defraud the Robertsons. At the date of the
Robertsons' transaetion, Smith did not know how he
was going to secure credit by the use of the Robertsons'
property. He knew only that the property was to be
mortgaged for this purpose and in this respect. Smith
had not formulated a financing program, nor did he
have an intent to organize the First Dividend Corporation to which the property was eventually transferred.
Organization of the First Dividend Corporation oecurred
about three months later and only after InterMountain
Capital Corporation refused to loan money to Sloan
Smith and Associates, Ltd., as InterMountaim Capital
Corporation could not loan money to a non-American
corporation; thus, necessitating the formulation of the
second company. (R-471).
The evidence is clear that at the time of the transfer
of the Robertsons' property to First Dividend and its
mortgage to InterMountain Capital, Smith and Geis
believed, and had a right to believe because of past
success, that the company would be able to pay the
$60,000.00 promissory note as it matured. Otherwise, they
would not have made as a part of the transaction the
mortgage of their own personal property, which was
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transferred to First Dividend \Vi th thP Robertson::;'
acres. 'l_'his prn1wrty consisted of a lot belonging to
Geis, whieli was valued at approximatel)'' $G,500.00,
Smith's home, in which his family resided, with an equity
of $30,000.00, Smith's stol'k in Interl\fonntain Capital
Corporation, worth approximately $10,000.00, and
personal guarantee to pay the note at a time when he
was worth a substantial amount of money and \\-hen his
financial adivities \\'Cl'l' ver>' successful. The lot, house,
stock, and the other assets pledged were accepted by
Inter.Mountain Capital Corporation for the satisfaction
of the note, and a df'fieiency judgment was entered
against Smith at the time of the default of the First
Dividend obligation to Interl\fonntain Capital Corporation. (R-470).

From the n•cord, we urge that neither Smith nor
Geis made any false or fraudulent repn·sentations which
were relied upon by the Robertsons and that in dealing
with the Robertsons in evPry instance, they acted in
good faith and with reasonable belief.
NON-RBJLIANCE

The law is clPar and definitP that

there is

no reliance, there cannot he fraud. In the case of Adam-

son, et ux., vs. Bruckfw11k, ct al., 112 Utah 52 (1947),
185 P.2d 2G4, the Court stated:
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To constitute actionable fraud, false representation
must relate to past or vresent fact and not be merely
promissory or expression of opinion, and circumstances
must justify defrauded parties' reliance or representation as basis of his decision or action without making
independent investigation of its truth or falsity, or he
must have been dissuaded or prevented from making
sufficient investigation.
Ln the case of Oberg us. Sanders, et al., 184 P.2d 229
( 1947), the court states:
"The basic elements of actual fraud are representation, its falsity, its materiality, the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ig110rance of its
trnth, his intent that the representation should be
acted on by the person and in the manner contemlllated, the hearer's ignorance of its falsity, his
relia11ce on its truth, his right to rely thereon,
(Italics added.)
and his

consequent and proximate injury."

'L'he evidence is nndisputed that the respondents,
Robertsons, did not rdy on any representations of Smith
and Geis: (R-334)

"Q.

Did vou have anv conversation with Mr. Geis
abou't mabng the changes in the areas yon
mentioned when you ultimately gave it to
him?
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A.

None heyond saying I wasn't pleased with
the way it read.

Q.

did you sign it without being plt>a::;ed!
Was anything said to him about thaU

A.

Yes, I think 1 told him if they wouldn't livP
up to that,
wouldn't live up to any
contract, or something to that effect."

Based upon the Pvidence when it appears the conclusion reached in the light of the attendant circumstances is so clearly and palpably umeasonable that no
tryer of fact acting fairly and reasonably could accept
it, then it must he rejected as a matter of law, by the
appellant Conrt. SeylJold vs. Uni.on Pacific Railroad Company, 121 Utah Gl, 239 P.2d 174; Continnztal Bank amd
1'ritst Company vs. Stewart, 4 Ut. 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890;
9 Wigmore Evidence, Section 2494.
CONCLUSION
The record dearly reflects that there was no reliance
by the Plaintiff Respon<lents, Rohertsons, on any representation claimed by them to hav(' been made by Defendant-Appellants Geis and Smith. Further, the statements made by Geis
clearly promissory in nature
and were made in good faith and related to future
action and conclnet which
he performed. 'l he
1

n•asonahly believed eonld
when viewed most favorably
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for them establishes that the trial court should have
found as a matter of law that Plaintiff-Respondents,
Robertsons, failed to meet by clear and convincing evidence their burden as to the elements of fraud. This
Court should reverse the judgment of the District Court
and direct it to enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellants
Smith and Geis.
Respectfully submitted,
GERALD L. TURNER
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Valley Professional Plaza
2525 South Main, Suite 14
DeLOS DAINES
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
822 Kearns Building
Attorneys for DefendantAppellants, Sloarn Smith and
Donald W. Geis

